The Commoditization Thesis: What Actually Happens When Software Gets Easy

The data is clear on what’s already happening. Labor’s share of GDP fell to 53.8% in Q3 2025 — the lowest in the modern BLS series back to 1947. Capital is eating labor’s lunch, and AI is accelerating it. Entry-level pressure is already visible: Stanford’s Digital Economy Lab found declines concentrated among 22–25 year-old workers in AI-exposed jobs such as software development, customer service, and clerical work. The narrower BLS category of computer programmers is projected to decline 6% through 2034, even while broader software development roles still grow. That distinction matters: implementation-heavy work gets pressured first. Meanwhile, workers with AI skills command meaningful wage premiums. PwC found an average 56% wage premium for workers with AI skills in 2024, and other labor-market reporting showed premiums up to 43% for jobs listing multiple AI skills. Tech salary growth slowed to 1.6% in 2025, down from 3.5% in 2023. This is not speculation. The compression is measurab